prosecution witnesses and respondent, the Juvenile Court found that the allegations in the petition were true and that respondent was a person described by § 602, and it sustained the petition. & Inst'ns Code §§ 607, 731 (1966). See also Donald L. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. . The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding double jeopardy applicable to juvenile proceedings. .". It is incarceration against one's will, whether it is called `criminal' or `civil.'" Cf. See generally State v. Halverson, 192 N.W.2d 765, 769 (Iowa 1971); Rudstein, Double Jeopardy in Juvenile Proceedings, 14 Wm. 1967). at 897-899. Although the juvenile court system had its genesis in the desire to provide a distinctive procedure and setting to deal with the problems of youth, including those manifested by antisocial conduct, our decisions in recent years have recognized that there is a gap between the originally benign conception of the system and its realities. It was not until 1896 that it was made clear that a defendant could seek a new trial after conviction, even though the Government enjoyed no similar right. See Ex parte Lane, 18 Wall. Rptr. In re William M., 3 Cal. Kay & Segal, The Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court Proceedings A Non-Polar Approach, 61 Geo.L.J. 1401 (1973); Carr, The Effect of the Double Jeopardy Clause on Juvenile Proceedings, 6 U.Tol.L.Rev. Following is the case brief for Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975). First, petitioner reasons that the procedure violated none of the policies of the Double Jeopardy Clause or that, alternatively, it should be upheld by analogy to those cases which permit retrial of an accused who has obtained reversal of a conviction on appeal. Plaintiff sued Defendant for false imprisonment. . Due process standards inevitably produce such an effect, but that tells us no more than that the Constitution imposes burdens on the functioning of government and especially of law enforcement institutions. 3d at 710, 95 Cal. That the flexibility and informality of juvenile proceedings are diminished by the application of due process standards is not open to doubt. 3d 575, 498 P.2d 1079 (1972), cert. After the Juvenile Court hearing, the court determined that Jones should be tried as an adult. 1971 Cal.Stats. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391, 303 U. S. 398 (1938). The same conclusion was reached by the California Court of Appeal in denying respondent's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Holmes' view has "never been adopted by a majority of this Court." & Mary L.Rev. See, e.g., National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Courts, Commentary to Standard 14.3, pp. . Plaintiff was free to remain where he was, or move in any other direction but the one direction obstructed by Defendant. On December 10, 1971, respondent, through his mother as guardian ad litem, filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. [Footnote 15] We, agree that such a holding will require, in most cases, that the transfer decision be made prior to an adjudicatory hearing. [Footnote 13], Petitioner argues that, even assuming jeopardy attached at respondent's adjudicatory hearing, the procedure by which he was transferred from Juvenile Court and tried on a felony information in Superior Court did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. or of juveniles themselves, of sufficient substance to render tolerable the costs and burdens, noted earlier, which the exception will entail in individual cases. Rptr. Prior to doing so, it may continue the hearing, if necessary, to receive the social study of the probation officer or to receive other evidence on its own motion or the motion of a parent or guardian for not to exceed 10 judicial days if the minor is detained during such continuance, and if the minor is not detained, it may continue the hearing to a date not later than 30 days after the date of filing of the petition. Justia makes no guarantees or warranties that the annotations are accurate or reflect the current state of law, and no annotation is intended to be, nor should it be construed as, legal advice. [Footnote 7]. & Inst'ns Code § 707 (1972), the governing criterion with respect to transfer, assuming the juvenile is 16 years of age and is charged with a violation of a criminal statute or ordinance, is amenability "to the care, treatment and training program available through the facilities of the juvenile court." advanced by petitioner inapplicable. 579, 22 U. S. 580 (1824). See n 5, supra. An amendment in 1971, not relevant here, lowered the jurisdictional age from 21 to 18. United States v. Jorn, supra, at 400 U. S. 479. & Inst'ns Code § 707 and subsequent trial there, "placed him in double jeopardy." A juvenile court proceeding is the same as an adult criminal court proceeding in many respects. 421 U.S. 519. 185, 189 (1971). 300-301 (1973). We recognize that juvenile courts, perhaps even more than most courts, suffer from the problems created by spiraling caseloads unaccompanied by enlarged resources and manpower. The object of a juvenile proceeding is to determine criminal guilt, and it results in a stigma of having committed a crime as well as the possible deprivation of liberty for many years.

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